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The understanding of international war, like many complex social events, may be - and has been - ap-
proached from a range of theoretical perspectives and via a variety of research strategies. Outside of the
work of Bloch (1898), Sorokin (1936), Richardson (1941), and Wright (1942), however, there was little re-
search of a scientific nature until the mid-1960s. And while these past fifteen years have certainly not given
us a compelling theory of international war, they have seen a steady growth in cumulative knowledge regar-
ding the correlates of war. These results, despite the expected mix of inconsistencies and anomalies, provide
us with some sense of the factors that are most consistently associated with war over the last century and a
half, along with some tentative insights into the rising and declining potency of these factors.
1. Introduction: the problem and prior
research
In an earlier paper on the state of the discip-
line (Singer 19$1), we have summarized and
interpreted virtually all of the data-based
work on the causes, correlates, and conditions
of modern international war, and certain
theoretical implications seem to emerge from
that largely North American enterprise. Two
of these are of particular interest here as we
propose some next steps in the search for ex-
planation of this relatively rare, but increa-
singly destructive form of global conflict. One
is that models built aroundxational attributes
do little in accounting for the distribution of
war across cases, regions, and time. If
researchers have been looking at the appro-
priate dimensions, there does not seem to be a
distinctive war-proneness profile (Richardson
1960; Rummel 1972). Nations with a dazzling
variety of political, economic, and social insti-
tutions and practices are found in fairly equal
numbers in the high and the low war frequen-
cy categories; nor does there seem to be a dis-
cernible trend over time. The only consistent
finding is the obvious one that the more po-
werful are the more war-prone (Bremer 1980),
and that the major powers clearly dominate in
this area of activity. Beyond industrial and
military capabilities, however, it seems to mat-
ter not whether the economy is state controll-
ed or market oriented, or the wealth is equally
distributed or highly concentrated, whether
the people are culturally homogenous, quite
diffused, or isolable into two or three clear
groupings, and so on.
This is not to suggest that national security
policies are fully determined by external sti-
muli or that domestic politics are of no conse-
quence. Rather, it would seem, we have been
too busy looking at the sorts of variables that
the comparative politics texts use to distin-
guish between nations. Our objective, how-
ever, is not to describe national societies but to
account for their foreign and security policies.
If we think of these policy elites as operating
at the interface between the domestic and the
external settings and trying to cope with the
demands and constraints generated by each,
the idea of interest articulation and aggrega-
tion comes readily to mind. Decision makers
move in and out of foreign conflict and to-
ward or away from the brink of war in res-
ponse to well-articulated orientations (Holsti
1979), interests, and needs (Choucri and
North 1975), including, of course, their own.
As our research moves away from goodness
of fit criteria to the confirmation of increa-
singly explanatory models, we will want to re-
turn to other domestic variables (as in M.
Haas 1965), but in the work proposed here we
will restrict ourselves to that of military and
industrial capabilities.
Shifting to the dyadic level of aggregation,
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the evidence is quite to the contrary, and
many of these variables seem quite potent in
accounting for the incidence of war. Defining
this dimension in the sense of both similarities
and interdependencies, the dyadic variables
seem to discriminate rather powerfully be-
tween war and no war outcomes when states
are in conflict or confrontation.
Similarly, we and others have found that
the properties of the international system help
to account for the incidence of war (Garnham
1979; Sullivan 1978). To take one of the more
persuasive findings, Singer and his colleagues
(1972) have accounted for nearly 80070 of the
variance in international war from 1816
through 1965 by looking only at the degree to
which military and industrial capabilities
among the major powers are concentrated in
the hands of one or two such powers, along
with the direction and rate of change therein.
In any event, there no longer seems to be
much doubt that the incidence of war can in-
deed be explained, and the question now is
not so much whether we can, but how to best
go about it. As suggested in the above sum-
mary, one of the choices we face is that of the
level of aggregation: the national, the dyadic,
and the systemic, and in the design that fol-
lows, we clearly opt - on the basis of previous
findings - for the latter two. A closely related
choice is that of proximity to the events that
we seek to explain. Whereas some would con-
tend that we will do better by focussing on the
conditions and events that occur just prior to
the denouement of war or no war in an inter-
national confrontation, others might suggest
that we ought to attend to those conditions
and events that are further away, in space as
well as in time, from the outcome phenome-
non. Often this perspective rests on the premi-
se that the ’die is cast’ well before the decisi-
on, and that the actors are well on the road to
one or another outcome in the months that
precede it and by dint of the factors that ob-
tain in the larger environment.
Up to now, we have generally accepted
this line of reasoning, and as already indi-
cated, not without success. But it is one thing
to achieve a good fit between one’s predictive
model and the observed historical patterns,
and quite another to achieve an explanation
of that fit. Thus, we are now moving into a
research phase that should further close the
gap between observed correlations and com-
pelling explanations. To do that, of course,
one must introduce behavioral variables into
what has been an essentially ecological type of
model.
2. The general plan and rationale
Thus, the next two years of work in the Cor-
relates of War project will be addressed to
four sets of research activities. First, given the
above considerations, and in light of what has
been disovered regarding those national, dya-
dic, and systemic conditions that are asso-
ciated with war (Zinnes 1980), we will integra-
te these results into a more general statistical
model in order to account for the war and no
war outcomes in our population of military
confrontations.
Up to now we have relied primarily on con-
tingency table analyses and a partitioning
strategy such that we can best discriminate be-
tween the war and no war outcome cases. The
strategy and findings were delivered at the
recent IPSA Congress in Moscow (Singer
1979). Second, we will try to account for the
behavior patterns that ultimately link those
ecological and contextual factors to the war
and no-war outcomes. To do this, we have to
identify the universe of military confronta-
tions that have occurred between and among
all members of the international system since
the Congress of Vienna; those involving one
or more of the system’s major powers
(N = 299) have already been identified, and
the balance (about 600 more) have been iden-
tified by systematically coding the diplomatic
histories of each sovereign nation during its
tenure in the system. A military confronta-
tion, in turn, is defined as a conflict in which
each protagonist has done at least one of the
following: a) made an explicit threat to resort
to military force, b) mobilized or re-deployed
its military forces, or c) actually resorted to
force short of war.
For the confrontations to be classified as
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having escalated to war, there must have been
sustained military hostilities involving the re-
gular armed forces of both sets of protago-
nists leading to at least 1000 battle-connected
fatalities. The wars (N = 115), the coding cri-
teria, and the data sources are reported in The
Wages of War (Singer & Small 1972, and the
revised edition, forthcoming).
Once the confrontations and their out-
comes are fully identified, we code all the con-
frontational acts taken by all the protagonists,
Specifying which type of act was taken when,
by which party, and toward whom. The cod-
ing criteria and rationale are reported in Leng
and Singer (1977), and inasmuch as the onset
of a confrontation as well as its ensuing acts
are all coded at the same time, that data base
has also been completed for the major powers
and will soon have been completed for the
balance of the system’s members.
Once these behavioral data have been gen-
erated, and we have ascertained the extent to
which they can be explained by the ecological
model, we will integrate them into the original
ecological/contextual model. That is, once we
better understand which behaviors occur un-
der which systemic, dyadic, and national con-
ditions, we will shift to our third phase, deve-
loping a computer simulation model that can
reveal which combinations of behavioral and
ecological variables best discriminate between
the war and no-war outcome during the seve-
ral historical periods. With those data sets ge-
nerated, the statistical analyses completed and
the simulation model running, we will turn to
the fourth set of activities: integrating the eco-
logical and behavioral sub-models into an
overall model with simulated decision rules
that should carry us another step closer to an
explanation of why certain military confron-
tations end in war (about 13070) and why the
balance do not.
Rather than summarize the theoretical mo-
del earlier, or even at this juncture, we post-
pone that until the final sub-model is discuss-
ed. This sub-model is, of course, the decisi-
onal one; representing an effort to bring to-
gether the background ecological factors and
the behavorial patterns on the one hand and
the outcome of war or no-war on the other.
As we see it, this task of closing the explana-
tory sequence may be approached from three
methodological perspectives. The most ambi-
tious is to try to get at the entire decision pro-
cess, using such traces as detailed minutes, the
memoirs of all the participants, or more re-
cently, films or tapes of all the proceedings.
Needless to say, this is virtually impossible
either for the early l9th or the late 20th centu-
ries ; any traces of the interactions of the parti-
cipants would invariably be incomplete and
potentially very misleading. A second strategy
is to get at the perceptions, preferences, and
predictions of the individual participants
(Axelrod 1976; Singer 1968; Stewart 1976),
but even if the researcher could obtain that
sort of information, coding and analyzing it
would not be very helpful, inasmuch as it
would reveal little about the interactions
among the individuals. Yet a third mode -
and the one utilized here - would be to simu-
late the decision process, and we use the word
simulation rather than representation quite
consciously (Alker and Brunner 1969; Barton
1970). That is, the purpose is not to recreate
and represent the decision makers’ inter-
actions, but to generate and test a variety of
hypothetical decision rules that turn out to be
consonant with those that could be in opera-
tion, given the observed ecological and beha-
vioral inputs and the observed war/no-war
output. To put it differently, the objective is
not to specify, but to abstract from, the deci-
sion process such that the inputs and outco-
mes can be linked via an ’as if’ process. If a
given set of decision makers respond in a gi-
ven way to a given set of stimuli, we can say
that, while we could not observe their decision
process and thus identify their decision rules
directly, they behaved as if they were follo-
wing a particular strategy and the decision ru-
les implied by that strategy (Simon 1969). We
emphasize that, for general predictive purpo-
ses, one can be fairly successful with a model
that ’merely’ specifies which behaviors arise
out of a given confrontational context, and
which combinations of context and behavior
typically eventuate in war. But if we hope to
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go beyond mere prediction and achieve a de-
gree of explanation, it is essential to probe the
black box and try to identify the decision rules
and algorithms that best account for the
context-behavior-outcome sequences (Whit-
ing 1975). Further, the accuracy of predicti-
ons resting upon an explanatory model, re-
flecting as they do the changing relations
among the variables, will usually be greater
than those that rest on simple post-dictions
and unexplained deviations therefrom.
3. The model and its variables
Having summarized the general research
plan, let us turn next to the overall model and
its basic variables; following that we will ad-
dress the decisional sub-model in greater de-
tail.
As already indicated, our central objective
in the next two years is to differentiate as pre-
cisely as we can between two types of inter-
state military confrontation: those that ended
in the sustained combat of war and those that
found (however temporarily) a less violent
outcome. To achieve that differentiation, we
will focus on three sets of variables: a) the
properties of ten global and regional system
within which the confrontation erupts and un-
folds ; b) the dyadic relationship that binds the
protagonists, contrasts their capabilities, and
constitutes their prior involvements with one
another; and c) the escalatory and de-escala-
tory moves that the protagonists take from
the beginning of the confrontation to its de-
nouement.
We proceed from three critical assump-
tions :
a) the international system is, by the nature
of its structure and culture, a moderately
conflictful one in which scarcities of a ma-
terial and symbolic sort abound, and in
which neither the institutions nor the
norms that might encourage coordination
of national interests across rival states and
blocs exist in sufficient strength;
b) the range of issues over which national go-
vernments can get into serious disputes is
exceedingly wide, but once the dispute be-
comes militarized, those issues diminish in
importance and are overshadowed by the
fundamental preoccupation with material
and symbolic security;
c) given the onset of a military confrontation,
domestic and bureaucratic considerations
limit the repertoire of possible moves and
counter-moves, thus diminishing the auto-
nomy of the protagonists and increasing
the potency of the contextual factors.
Given these assumptions regarding the on-
set of a military confrontation, we turn next to
the three sets of critical variables that are ex-
pected to affect its outcome, indicating their
expected separate effects, ceteris paribus. Per-
haps most potent are those at the dyadic level,
with the following five seen as playing the do-
minant role in determining the outcome of the
confrontation.
First in potency is that of the relative capa-
bilities of the protagonists, measured primari-
ly in terms of military expenditure, personnel,
and a weapons lethality-survivability index
(Dupuy 1979); all else being equal, the model
says that the nearer the protagonists are to
equality, the greater the likelihood of escala-
tion to war. Next is the geographical contigui-
ty of the actors to one another and to the site
of the confrontation; proximity is seen not
only as enhancing the capabilities of one or
both sides, but also as raising the incentive to
escalate. Third are the military alliances, re-
flecting the likelihood of n‘&dquo; parties interven-
ing on one or both sides and thus changing the
relative capabilities as well as the incentives
and constraints toward escalation. We assume,
and the evidence partially confirms, that for-
mal alliances with nth parties serve as a con-
straining force in confrontations. Fourth, and
closely related, are the bonds and links be-
tween the protagonists themselves; the links
of trade and alliance are seen, again with
some modest empirical support, as conducive
to escalatory behavior, however inhibiting
they may be in reducing the frequency of mili-
tary confrontation (Gochman 1980; Singer
1979). As to past interactions, fifth, the effects
are seen to be mixed, reflected in ’learned’ re-
sponses to successes and failures in previous
confrontations and wars; the limited evidence
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suggests that prior failures are more likely to
inhibit bellicosity than exacerbate it, despite
the plausibility of either assumption.
Turning to systemic factors, at the regional
as well as the global levels, three basic ones
concern us here. The first is structural clarity,
by which we mean the extent to which the
coalition configurations and the capability
rankings in the system are sufficiently clear to
permit confident predictions by decision ma-
kers as to which states will line up with whom
if the confrontation goes to war, and the com-
bined capabilities that would be arrayed (Sin-
ger and Bouxsein 1975). While the evidence is
mixed, we see clarity here as exercising a be-
nign effect, and ambiguities as conducive to
escalation. A closely related systemic factor is
concentration: the extent to which the
region’s (or globe’s) resources (ranging from
industrial and military to diplomatic and cul-
tural) are equally distributed or concentrated
in the hands of a few dominant states. While
high concentration may bode ill for social ju-
stice, it seems to exercise a restraining effect
upon confrontations that occur in its pres-
ence. Next is systemic interdependence,
reflecting the extent to which the regional or
global system’s members are linked together
via trade, diplomatic, alliance, or internatio-
nal organization bonds, and here there is little
empirical evidence and most of that is weak.
However, with some of the neo-functionalists
(Keohane & Nye 1977), we postulate interde-
pendence (and its more developed version, in-
tegration) as exercising an essentially benign
and restraining effect on escalatory behavior.
Whereas these three sets of variables are
structural in character and show fluctuations
over time, the other two are material and cul-
tural respectively, and they show rather stea-
dy secular trends rather than fluctuations
across time. Thus the fourth is that of mate-
rial resource availability in the system and is
measured in terms of the amount of land, re-
sources, and markets that are not yet (at the
time of the confrontation) fully controlled by
sovereign states. The smaller the remaining
amounts, the more the ’frontier has been clos-
ed,’ and the greater will be the propensity to
escalate. Similarly, the fifth factor, while cul-
tural in nature, also shows a secular trend, but
in the opposite direction (Kegley 1979). We
refer to the disapproval of military force as an
instrument of state policy, and measure it in
terms of the fraction of states in the regional
or global system that score at certain levels on
an illegitimacy of war scale. As implied ear-
lier, we do not expect, and have not found, all
of our relationships to be constant across ti-
me, and some preliminary examinations sug-
gest that factors such as these latter two may
be accounting for certain of our parameter
shifts, especially those that occur around the
turn of the century.
Turning finally to national level attributes
(as distinct from behavior), we have already
indicated that materiai capabilities seem to be
the only one that systematically discriminates
between low and high war-proneness. In the
model at hand, national capabilities are trans-
lated into dyadic comparisons, and the work-
ing assumption is that the nearer the prota-
gonists are to parity, the greater the probabili-
ty of escalatory behavior. And in the Methods
and Procedures section we discuss the indica-
tors that are being developed and tested.
Having summarized the key variables in the
ecological model and indicated the individual
role that each is expected to play in the un-
folding of military confrontations, we now
suggest in broad terms how these factors flow
into and impinge upon one another in these
brink-of-war episodes. Very simply, our var-
iables fall into one of two theoretical catego-
ries and their role in the model is a function of
those categories.
On the one hand are the variables that re-
present the stakes in the confrontation and
the dispute that preceded it. The stakes can be
of two sorts: hopes and fears. By hopes, we
mean those outcomes that the protagonist’s
decision makers would like to achieve and ac-
quire, and by fears we mean those outcomes
they would like to avoid. Hopes are the gains
that the decision makers seek, and fears are
the losses that they strive to prevent. Thus, we
postulate that our simulated decision makers
will be motivated by the prospects and proba-
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bilities of gaining or losing territory, resour-
ces, markets, allies, prestige, credibility, and
the like (Wright 1965).
The crucial element is not only one of how
salient and valued the stakes are and what uti-
lity and disutility scores will be assigned to
each projected (hoped or feared) outcome of
the confrontation; it is equally a matter of
probabilities. The subjective likelihood of
success and of failure is seen as interacting
with the value (positive or negative) they as-
sign to the possible outcomes, thus generating
the familiar ’expected utilities.’ The above,
then, outlines the general model, its key var-
iables, and the postulated interactions among
them. To this juncture, we will rely heavily on
a range of statistical methods for best iden-
tifying the separate and combined effects of
these ecological variables on the behavior of
the protagonists and the outcome of military
confrontations. But as we move to incorporate
the ecological conditions and the behavioral
events into an increasingly explanatory mo-
del, its representation will shift from the sta-
tistical mode to a more dynamic computerized
simulation mode. Even with the advances of
recent years in the statistical analysis field (Alt
1980), the problems of accurately capturing
political processes as complex and inter-
dependent as these remain nearly insurmoun-
table. Thus, as the model becomes increasing-
ly complete, we will rely less on statistical treat-
ment and more on a computerized one.
4. The decisional model
While more detail is provided in the Methods
and Procedures section, a few preliminary ob-
servations regarding the decision making si-
mulation model are in order here. First, even
though the research strategy to be used here
seems the most appropriate and powerful at
this stage in the development of the interna-
tional politics discipline, its limitations should
not be ignored. The critical limitation, of
course, is that it rests on procedures that are
quite indirect, requiring that we merely infer
throughput on the basis of observed input and
output. Therefore, as our findings increasing-
ly suggest that certain sets of decision rules are
not being used under certain ecological condi-
tions and that certain other ones are being
used, we would want to go the next step and
begin to look inside the ’black box.’ That
operation, as we suggest above, would not
make research sense now, but there is little
question that we must eventually - if fuller ex-
planation be the objective - get at the percep-
tions, preferences, and predictions of the de-
cision makers as well as the interactions
among them.
Let us shift now to the types of decision
rules we might expect to find. There would seem
to be three basic dimensions to the typology.
First, and most generally, is the rationality di-
mension : to what extent do which types of na-
tional security elites, under which sets of con-
ditions, follow which procedures of rational
problem solving? Where, in other words, on
the problem solving-to-random walk contin-
uum do we find our decision processes? While
this remains a constant preoccupation, this
stage of our research can shed at best only in-
direct light on the question. Suffice to say
here, the evidence to date is sufficiently mixed
to suggest that the norm is not very close to
either end of the continuum.
The second dimension, and the one that has
captured much of the research attention in
our field, is that of the ’driving force’. Do na-
tional governments, in their routine inter-
actions with one another, respond primarily
to domestic politics, internal and external eco-
nomic incentives and constraints, military se-
curity considerations, ideological imperatives,
geographical realities, or what? More particu-
larly, when their interactions shift to crisis
and confrontation, which of these factors are
dominant? Once more, the body of specula-
tive and systematic research is far from negli-
gible, but the evidence remains inconclusive.
Our reading of that evidence, however, is that
all of these are at work in confrontational de-
cision processes, but that the classical
realpolitik factors typically become domi-
nant, with a remarkable homogeneity across
nations, cases, and time. To put it another
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way, we find fairly strong grounds for believ-
ing that considerations of domestic politics,
economic goals, and ideological consistency
do not disappear but become enmeshed with
and interpreted in terms of the rather simple
criteria of physical security. Hence, geograph-
ic, military, alliance, and diplomatic factors
dominate in the model with which we work.
But even if it turns out that confrontational
decisions are taken in a relatively rational
manner and in response to traditional security
considerations, a considerable latitude never-
theless remains. Thus, the third dimension in
our decisional typology is that of hawk-to-
dove, and it is the position that governments
take on this dimension that will receive our re-
search attention. There is no intention here of
scaling state behavior on the rationality di-
mension or on the driving force dimension.
We assume that confrontational behavior is
purposive in orientation and relatively ratio-
nal in its formulation. And we assume that
the multiplicity of drives and interests will be-
come more limited and focussed as a conflict
escalates from the minor dispute to the mili-
tary confrontation stage. There will be no em-
pirical test of these assumptions here, whereas
one of our major objectives is to ascertain the
contextual and behavioral conditions that
generate the range of hawkish and dovish
moves that appear in these 900 or so confron-
tations.
5. Methods and procedures
Limitations of space as well as uncertainty as
to specific methodological details always
make this section of a proposal somewhat
unsatisfactory. This is especially true, as is the
case here, when a long-range investigation is
in transition from one set of theoretical foci
to another and thus from reliance on one set
of methods to increasing reliance on other
and less familiar methods. However, the sum-
mary that follows should offer a reasonably
coherent description and rationale of the
procedures that have been followed in recent
stages and will be followed in the next several
years.
5.1 Preliminary statistical analyses
As indicated earlier, the first of our proposed
four phases is well underway, with the objec-
tive to better ascertain the contextual configu-
rations under which the variables discussed
previously tend to be associated with escala-
tory or de-escalatory behavior. Previous re-
search has shown several of these associations
to be inconsistent across time or across con-
texts defined by explicitly considered var-
iables, and we need to better understand these
configurations of variables before we can pre-
cisely specify the variables, parameters, and
algorithms to be used in the computer simula-
tion models.
Our analyses will proceed from those alrea-
dy reported (Stoll & Champion 1980; Singer
1979); there, we employ multivariate contin-
gency table analyses to help illuminate the
varying associations between variables of in-
terest and escalation, while controlling for
third variables. Earlier analyses suggest that
the associations that emerge rest on fairly
complex, non-linear interactions of predictor
variables, and our contingency table analysis
strategy seems best suited for the somewhat
exploratory analyses needed in this first stage
of our next round of analyses (Fienberg 1977;
Tukey 1977).
5.2 The ’descriptive’ computer simulation
Once the results of the contingency analyses
are in for the most important variables (late
1982), we shall begin intensive work on the se-
cond analysis stage, specifying and testing a
computer simulation of the dynamic unfold-
ing of a militarized dispute from the perspec-
tive of a given state’s decision makers. We
have already developed and tested several mo-
dels that employ the general approach de-
scribed previously. In the first (Stoll & Cham-
pion 1980), we seek to account for the escala-
tion of militarized disputes to a war/no war
outcome on the basis of three unmeasured
variables: the security-based stakes in the dis-
pute, the likelihood of victory by one side
should the dispute be ’resolved’ by hostilities,
and the degree of opportunity for the more
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powerful protagonist to retaliate against the
’provocations’ of the much weaker state. The
’stakes’ variable is indicated by a fairly simple
function of the contiguity of a state to the site
of the dispute, the extent to which its adversa-
ry is arming rapidly and/or allocating a high
percentage of its resources to the military, and
the prior conflict between the states; it is re-
duced by alliance and IGO (international
inter-governmental organizations) bonds be-
tween the antagonists. The likelihood of mili-
tary victory is indicated by differences in the
military expenditures of the anatagonists, the
availability of defense-pact allies to the target
state, and the distance of the parties to the site
of the dispute. ’Opportunity’ is indicated by a
vast disparity in military expenditures, the ab-
sence of major power allies on the weaker
side, initiation of the military activity in the
dispute by the weaker side, and the absence of
bonds between the antagonists.
The model predicts escalation of the con-
frontation under either of two conditions: a)
if both sides have high stakes in the dispute
and both have a ’reasonable’ chance of vic-
tory (i.e, there is essential military parity); or
b) if there is a massive disparity in capability
and the stronger side has ample ’opportunity’
to use force against the weaker. Thus, the mo-
del can predict wars of aggrandizement by a
strong state against a weak one and wars in
which the sense of threat is more reciprocal
(and when such considerations as the desir-
ability of pre-emption or preventive war are
relevant).
This simple model currently accounts for 25
of the 28 wars in a sample of 225 serious dis-
putes involving at least one major power and
occurring between 1816 and 1977. Its success
is marred, however, by a tendency to be ’alar-
mist’ in its predictions; it falsely predicts that
37 additional disputes ended in war, when in
fact they did not.
A later model developed by Stoll takes a
more detailed look at both the escalation pro-
cess and the decision making mechanisms of a
’typical’ major power. It postulates that three
separate ’organizations’ - a military com-
mand, a diplomatic corps, and an intelligence
service - separately monitor the course of an
ongoing confrontation. The former two re-
commend (possibly different) responses (do
nothing, threaten force, display force, use
force, or go to war) whenever a military ac-
tion is taken by its protagonist.
The military function considers several sim-
ple indices - relative military expenditures, di-
stance to the site of the dispute, the recent
won/lost records of the two sides, and the
presence of major power allies - recommend-
ing escalation if the military situation is
strongly in the choosing state’s favor. The di-
plomatic function recommends escalation if
the relations between the sides to the dispute
have been unfriendly (many disputes or wars
in recent years) and de-escalation if relations
have been more positive (i.e, few disputes, no
wars, and/or the presence of an alliance be-
tween the states). The intelligence function
does not make a direct recommendation, but
calculates the long term capabilities of the two
sides, including other measures of national
capability, as well as who has intervened in
support of whom, and the non-disputant al-
lies of each side. If the military and diploma-
tic functions make the same recommendation,
that action is taken; if not, the overall capabi-
lity balance returned by the intelligence func-
tion is considered. If that ratio is favorable to
the deciding state, the more forceful action is
taken; if unfavorable, the less forceful action
is taken.
The next version of our computer model
will build from and reflect the logic of both of
these efforts, as we attempt to predict the be-
havior of State X as it responds to each new
military action by its opponent (States
Y 1 ... Yn) and its co-protagonists (States XI 1
...Xm). There will again be two fairly dis-
tinct sets of calculations: What are the stakes
of the dispute, i.e., the potential gains and
losses from a policy of escalation or war, and
the probability that the use of military force
would be successful. Again, the actual ’deci-
sion’ to escalate would depend on both sets of
considerations in a multiplicative fashion.
In the earlier models, the calculation of the
’stakes’ was quite crude and undifferentiated;
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we will now use a larger number of variables
in a more modular way. Here, the ’stakes’ cal-
culations would be modelled as a simple set of
conditional and arithmetic decision rules
yielding a positive value for ’hopes’ and a
negative value for ’fears’. For example, the
degree of ’fear’ associated with a state being
militarily surpassed by an enemy might be
specified:
IF (State Y has had many disputes with State
X)
AND (State Y is now weaker than State X)
AND (State Y is projected to be stronger than
State X in 5 years)
THEN Fear = Projected Relative Capability
(C/Y) - Current Relative Capability
OTHERWISE Fear = 0
Each such ’hope’ and ’fear’ calculation will
yield a number that will be weighted by im-
portance and summed to result in the total
’stakes’ score. This can be seen as a ’recom-
mendation’ for or against escalation; a posi-
tive value will tend to produce escalatory be-
havior while a negative value recommends de-
escalation. But before a given action can be
predicted, a recommendation to escalate must
be weighted by the overall military/political
balance of capability, i.e., the likelihood of
successful military action. EFFECTIVE CA-
PABILITY is our label for the new abstract
variable analogous to the ’likelihood of suc-
cess’ calculation in the first model and the ’in-
telligence’ function in our second computer
model. It will consider the overall military si-
tuation, including the ability of all parties to
reach each other and the site of the dispute,
the likelihood and effectiveness of interven-
tion by the allies of each side, and the long-
run potential capability of both protagonists
and their allies.
IF (B1*S1 + B2*S2 + ...Bk*Sk)




The Ss represent the values of each of the
k ’stakes’ calculations,
Bs are the weights on each incentive
Ts are the threshold values sufficient to
predict an escalation to conflict level I
We shall use a number of variables in the
stakes calculations which might be grouped
by the specific ’hopes’ and ’fears’ to which
they are relevant. Since we do not have data
readily available on all the variables mention-
ed, nor the resources to collect them in the
next two years, we will pursue them in some-
what separate but highly interdependent ana-
lyses. For those that appear promising but
where data availability is problematic, the re-
levant ’stakes’ calculations will be included
only for a subset of historical cases (usually
the years since 1945). Data for those variables
that show particular promise, and discernibly
add to the predictive power of the overall mo-
del, will be collected over the longer and wider
empirical domain.
At present, the following considerations
appear most important:
Pre-emption. Can state X prevail militarily in
the current situation only if it strikes first?
Here we will examine the extent to which the
confrontations were characterized by the in-
centive to pre-empt, usually as a function of
mobilization and transport logistics and wea-
pons technology. Whether pre-emption actu-
ally occurred or not, the important question is
whether cases that ended in war were indeed
those in which the condition was present. In
the nuclear-missile age, this would be a functi-
on of the survivability and lethality of the
opposing weapon systems, but in 1914 for
example, it was essentially a function of the
mobilization plans and the transport systems
upon which successful mobilization rested.
Throughout the period under study, these
conditions have appeared and disappeared in
response to technological developments and
changes in military strategy.
Preventive war. Are the long-term trends such
that State X is about to be outclassed by State
Y so that X considers it a choice between war
now on its terms, or later, on Y’s? This is
quite similar to Organski’s (1968) notion of
the ’power transition,’ a proposition that is
associated with major power war, at least in
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the 19th century (Champion & Stoll forth-
coming). It addresses essentially the same-
question as the ’pre-emption’ calculations
above, but from a longer-term perspective.
Here we would be looking at highly aggrega-
ted indices of military-industrial capability
(see Bremer 1980) rather than at the details of
the military situation in a particular dispute.
Economic Gain. Could State X obtain a val-
uable economic resource, market, or control
of a trade route by force? While there has
been little systematic research on ’the econo-
mic causes of war’ in the past few decades, re-
cent events have made these questions very sa-
lient. Here again, we will not be able to obtain
data for the entire empirical domain, but we
will obtain data on resource dependence/
trade, investment, etc. for the twentieth cen-
tury major powers, and shall rely on coding
of narrative sources concerning particular dis-
putes, since adequate, reliable time-series data
are very scarce on such variables before
World War II and even into the present.
Territorial Gain. Could State X gain or re-
gain by force control of a disputed or strategi-
cally important territory from State Y? We
are well along in the collection of a data set on
all territorial transfers by force or otherwise,
and will also use the data and analyses
generated by Weede (1973).
Inter-state Bonds. If State X is closely tied to
State Y in military alliances, diplomatic
bonds, and similar IGO ties, military conflict
would have disruptive effects far beyond the
immediate issues at stake. Our data sets for
these variables are complete.
Economic Ties. Close and well-managed eco-
nomic bonds between states would impose
high ’opportunity costs’ on a policy of escala-
tion. This data set is now being generated and
should be ready by early 1982.
After the initial specification and testing of
this model has been completed, we will per-
form fairly extensive sensitivity tests on the
variables and parameters. This should help us
determine which considerations and variables
do little to improve our ability to predict esca-
lation, and hence can be dropped for reasons
of parsimony, and should help us fine-tune
the numerical parameters to maximize the
model’s goodness of fit. Also, we will expand
the model to explicitly allow some parameters
to vary across time and states. For example, a
state with a history of unsuccessful war invol-
vements seems likely to behave in a ’risk-
adverse’ manner; that is, it would require
higher incentives and/or a higher likelihood
of success to take an escalatory act than might
be expected from decision makers in a more
typical state. Operationally, we will specify an
additional set of routines that vary the ’T’
(threshold) parameters as a function of the
outcome of prior disputes and the gains/
losses from previous wars. Similarly, we will
build from the work of Bueno de Mesquita
(1978), who has used measures of the change
in the polarity of inter-state alliance bonds to
tap the orientation toward risk of national de-
cision makers during confrontations. This fits
with our hypotheses relating the ’structural
clarity’ of the international system to the like-
lihood of war (Singer & Bouxsein 1975), and
we now believe that the idea of escalation
thresholds that vary as a function of such con-
ditions can tap these concerns in the context
of our emerging model.
5.3 The ’explanatory’ computer simulation
In this last stage, we hope to devise and test a
version of the model that incorporates a
richer and more plausible conception of the
psychological and organizational processes of
decision making (Irwin 1971; Steinbrunner
1974). Unlike the model outlined so far,
which is equivalent to a complex and non-
linear structural equation, this next model
would be based on non-numerical, pattern
matching procedures in the ’artificial intelli-
gence’ tradition (Simon 1969). For example,
such a model might specify in some detail
some stereotypical strategies to be pursued in
international disputes, ranging from outright
conquest to capitulation. The model would
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proceed in three basic steps: First, it would at-
tempt to infer what the other side is ’up to’;
that is, which strategy best accounts for its be-
havior. In doing so, the model would use the
information it ’knows’ about each strategy
and the kinds of states that employ them.
Next, its algorithms would choose an appro-
priate counter-strategy, using some sort of
representation of the choosing state’s goals
and a ’counter-planning’ procedure (Carbo-
nell 1978). Third, the simulated government
would apply the decision rules specified by the
chosen strategy. This would involve monitor-
ing the behavior of the target state to see if it
corresponds to that ’desired’ by the strategy,
and taking the appropriate action. For ex-
ample, a stragegy of coercion would specify
that a threat be issued first (George 1971). If
the specified behavior were not forthcoming
(i.e., the response was defiance as in Leng
1980), the model would carry out the threat
or, if conditions were not deemed appropriate
by additional decision rules, it would allow its
’bluff’ to be called. If the response of the
other side were totally unaccountable, the
whole process of inferring the strategy follo-
wed by the other side would enter another ite-
ration (Ostrom 1977).
6. Conclusion
Since its inception a decade and a half ago,
the Correlates of War project has focussed on
one central problem: that of explaining the in-
cidence of international war. It has been a
slow and tedious process not only because of
the absence of much prior work from which
we might build, and the virtual absence of
compelling models and relevant data sets.
These problems have been compounded by
the plethora of plausible hypotheses and
frameworks, fluctuating priorities and shift-
ing methodologies in political science, and er-
ratic funding.
Yet our work has continued at a steady
pace, producing a large number of high quali-
ty data sets (in wide use by researchers, teach-
ers, and students here and abroad), a number
of speculative, integrative, and conceptual
articles, a long list of empirical studies, and a
respectable flow of books. Equally important
has been the training of nearly a score of doc-
toral and post-doctoral students, many of
whom have since made important contribu-
tions to the disipline.
As the world moves once more back to the
abyss of war, interest in our research has
heightened considerably, making for (inter
alia) a growing number of graduate students
seeking to work in the international conflict
field. The research that is proposed here rep-
resents a serious effort to build in a careful
and creative way on the prior work that has
been completed by our team and others, and
to move as rapidly as possible toward a com-
pelling explanatory theory of war. While it re-
flects our commitment to a careful, cumulati-
ve strategy, it is also responsive to theoretical
and methodological developments in the
field, as well as to the opportunities for that
possible new insight that could suddenly illu-
minate the path and perhaps lead to a more
direct and rapid advance in our knowledge.
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